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Objectives: The increasing of potential medical demand in China has threatened the health of the popu-
lation, the medical equity, accessibility to medical services, and has impeded the development of Chinese
health delivery system. This study aims to understand the mechanism of the increasing potential medical
demand and find some solutions.
Methods: We constructed a system dynamics model to analyze and simulate this problem, to predict the
influences of health policies on the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care (adjusting the
quantity structure of hospitals and community health systems (CHSs), adjusting outpatient prices, and
adjusting the level of health insurance).
Results: Decreasing the number of hospitals, increasing the number of CHSs, and raising the proportion of
health insurance compensation would effectively increase the transformation of potential medical
demand. But currently, changes of the outpatient prices didn’t play a role in the transformation of poten-
tial medical demand.
Conclusions: Combined with validation analysis and model simulation, we suggest some possible
solutions. The main factors causing potential medical demand are accessibility to medical services and
proportion of health insurance compensation. Thus, adjusting the number of hospitals and CHSs and
increasing the proportion of health insurance compensation should decrease the actual percentage of
patients not seeking medical care and accelerate the transformation of potential medical demand, which
deserved being concerned in policymaking.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Problem/significance
Currently, owing to the rapid growth of medical expenses and
the unreasonable structure of China’s health delivery system, there
exists an unusual phenomenon, wherein as the supply of medical
services increases, demand shows an unexpected decreasing trend.
In fact, this potential medical demand (PMD) exists extensively in
China. In this study, PMD is defined as medical need that has not
been transformed into actual demand. PMD can be divided into
one of two types: one that can be transformed into actual demand,
and one that cannot. In China, the amount and structure of the sup-
ply and demand of medical services are out of balance, and this
greatly influences the equal and effective use of medical services.
Therefore, to understand and analyze the PMD problem in China,this study sets forth a system dynamics (SD) simulation model
by which to determine the main influencing factors and their
mechanisms on PMD transformation; in this way, we can deter-
mine the best ways of transforming more PMD by making health
policy adjustments.
Survey results vis-à-vis the demand for and use of medical ser-
vices from 1993 to 2008 in urban and rural China are shown in
Table 1; these are taken from An Analysis Report of National Health
Services Survey in China [11]. As one can see, both of the medical
services-use indexes show increasing trends; of these, the two-
week medical consultation rate was in decline before 2003, but
manifested a significant increase in both urban and rural areas in
2008. The annual rate of hospitalization, meanwhile, persistently
increased between 1993 and 2008. These two PMD indexes gener-
ally showed an increasing trend, especially since the start of the
21st century, and although a slight declining tendency appeared
in 2008, China’s PMD continues to be large. The results of our anal-
ysis suggest that the growth of medical services supply and the
decline in affordable medical demand had led to a low utilization
rate, and the increased amount of PMD in China has dramatically
Table 1
Survey results of demand for and use of medical services from 1993 to 2008 in urban and rural China.
Index 1993 1998 2003 2008
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Two-week medical consultation rate (%) 19.9 16.0 16.2 16.5 11.8 13.9 12.7 15.2
Two-week untreated rate (%) 42.4 33.7 49.9 33.2 57.0 47.8 37.6 37.3
Annual rate of hospitalization (%) 5.0 3.1 4.8 3.1 4.2 3.4 7.1 6.8
Percentage of patients not being hospitalized (%) 26.2 40.6 29.5 35.5 27.8 30.3 26.0 24.7
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lyze the reasons behind the growth of PMD and to seek reasonable
health policies by which PMD can be transformed. At the same
time, we need to highlight the factors that influence the two-
week medical consultation rate, two-week untreated rate, annual
rate of hospitalization, and the percentage of patients not being
hospitalized; in urban areas, these are the provision of health
insurance, family income [31], quality of care, and accessibility to
medical care [72,64]. The factors that influence the four indexes
in rural areas are the provision of health insurance [91], family
income [98], medical costs, health status, socioeconomic status
[60], and race [70]. Ultimately, no significant difference has been
found in the demand for and use of medical services, between
urban and rural areas.
The literature and survey results in China and elsewhere have
explored the factors that influence medical demand, as well as
those factors’ underlying mechanisms. One of the most
important factors refers to the patients themselves. Various stud-
ies have focused on the universal factors influencing patients’
medical demand, such as health insurance (patients with health
insurance were more likely to receive health care when it was
needed) [10,52,21,72,48], economic status and monthly salary
[30,60,73], health status [30,60,12], demographic factors (includ-
ing gender, age, race, living settings, education level, and city
size) [52,21,72,48,73], and patients’ perceptions on medical need
and medical use [65], types of health profiles [59], and social
relations [81]. Another important influencing factor is the health
care providers themselves. The quality of medical services [81],
human resource structure, the provision of public and private
services, reforms in health department, fee structure of health
service system [68], and the degree of supplier-induced demand
[84] will have an impact on medical decisions of health care
providers.
In addition, more and more studies have focused on medical
services demand in developing countries, such as those of the
determinants of medical demand [63,1,19,26,79,2], the influencing
factors of (and the changes to) medical demand, predictions of
medical demand in the future [9,33,40,41,74,75,49], and the poten-
tial demand for AIDS vaccines in Thailand [87]. Additionally, some
researchers have discussed the elasticity of medical demand in
Ghana [50]; the elasticity of medical demand in a certain province
of China [53]; the elasticity of medical demand among groups of
infants, children, and low-income service recipients [79]; and the
elasticity of medical demand among outpatients in China [98].
Additionally, some studies have explored the phenomenon of
unmet medical demand. In exploring unmet medical demand and
its influencing factors among various social groups, researchers
have examined homeless adults [17], young adults [61], the dis-
abled elderly [62], and children [42]. Some other studies explored
the reasons behind an increase in unmet medical demand, and its
solutions [80]; unmet medical demand regarding different types of
disease [82]; and different methods of assessing unmet medical
demand and the use of medical services [4].
Moreover, among studies of medical demand, a variety of
methods and models have been used in analysis, estimation, anddetermination. A two-part model and a discrete factor model were
used to analyze a dataset that consisted of 6407 urban households
in China, and to identify and estimate the determinants of medical
demand based on the interaction between growth in medical
demand and the shortage of medical care funds [31]. A stochastic
dynamic programming model was used to research the influencing
factors of medical demand [57]. The Grossman health capital
model in a stochastic environment was used to investigate the
effect of long-term care (LTC) insurance on medical care demand,
mainly by comparing the influence of means-tested and health-
based LTC programs on medical care consumption, decisions, and
welfare [5]. A Probit regression model and a zero-truncated nega-
tive binomial regression model were used to test the effects of
price and income on medical demand in rural China [98]. A
Heckman-type model was employed to estimate medical demand
and explore the influencing factors of medical demand in African
countries [70]. A simplified version of a dynamic Grossman house-
hold production model was used to explore the effect of uncer-
tainty of illness on medical demand [69], and Grossman’s health
production model and national survey data were also used to esti-
mate the effect of digital health information on medical demand
[20,38,89]. A generalized version of Grossman’s health capital
model was considered to examine medical demand, by testing
the health capital model; it was also used to identify the key fac-
tors of the medical demand equation [45]. Finally, many health
economists have developed medical demand models to predict
medical demand [15,25,35,36,77,34].
There have also been some studies about medical demand in
China. For example, some studies have analyzed medical demand,
need, and service use in different regions in China [99,93]; exam-
ined a PMD-transformation system by constructing a logical model
[54,55]; determined the influencing factors of medical demand by
examining both theoretical and empirical elements and using an
ordered Probit model [54,55,58,39,56,97]; and looked at the chang-
ing tendencies and characteristics of medical demand [92]. All
these studies mainly concentrate on theoretical research and
description analysis of the previous and current situation; how-
ever, they do have some limitations. For example, they cannot pre-
dict developing tendencies by simulating a system, and they
cannot simulate whether or not a policy will exert a positive role
in a health delivery system.
Therefore, to successfully transform PMD into actual demand,
and in response to a proposal to bring about equity of medical ser-
vices, we should make great efforts to identify the reasons behind
PMD, recognize the mechanism by which PMD is transformed, pin-
point solutions to the problem of PMD transformation, and then
improve the equity of medical services in China.
1.2. Objective
This study aims to determine the influencing factors of PMD
and seek out transformation strategies, and thus provide reason-
able evidence of scientific health resource allocation, balance the
supply and demand of medical services, and ultimately bring about
equity of medical services in China.
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2.1. System dynamics model
The SD model is designed for use with large and complex
systems; it is used to solve dynamic and complicated system
issues, and it has been applied in a variety of fields. It has guided
policy-making, helped find solutions to some specific problems,
and assisted in assessing and optimizing interventions with regard
to some socioeconomic issues.
In terms of the science and rationality of the SD model, more
and more studies are leveraging it to examine various systems
and problems; they mainly concentrate on fields in education,
economy, policy, environment, medicine, and health, and the
results thereof can be seen in the literature. Researchers have
undertaken studies of supply and demand in a variety of fields,
including medical service demand; other studies have touched
upon water demand estimation [71], supply chain dynamics in
health care services [78], supply and demand in LTC [43], forecasts
of the demand for medical specialists [8], and the prediction of
health care demands [88,18]. Previous studies on medical demand
have mainly used theoretical analysis, empirical analysis, investi-
gation analysis, and some other health economics models [20,38,
57,69,45,89,31,5,70,98]—all of which are mainly suitable for
describing the current situation and analyzing the influencing fac-
tors of medical demand. However, they cannot predict or simulate
long-term changes that will take place in the future. Both previous
and current data can be used to construct and validate an SD
model; by leveraging the simulation function of the SD model,
one can not only describe the current situation, determine the
influencing factors, and predict future tendencies, but also observe
changes under a variety of policy scenarios [90]. Therefore, to
achieve a long-term vision of the current system and increase
the validity of policy-making and reform scenarios, it is feasible
to study PMD transformation by using an SD simulation model.
Compared to a variety of other methods, the SD model offers
obvious advantages. First, compared to mathematical models, the
SD model can help us understand the various levels of influence
of specific populations or issues—a tack frequently taken in
research in overweight conditions and obesity, for example [23].
Second, unlike a ‘‘snapshot-in-time” study, studies that make use
of the SD approach can examine circular feedback processes; this
is a more practical and comprehensive method [27]. Third, the
SD model allows one to explain and understand dynamic interac-
tions further and better, by intermingling the influencing factors
with some complex systems and problems [18]. Fourth, unlike
some other approaches, the SD model overcomes acknowledged
deficiencies, such as isolated, static, and one-sided analysis; as
such, an SD model is a powerful tool in exploring difficult and com-
plex management problems [76]. Fifth, compared to econometrics
and input–output analysis, an SD model does not require high-
quality statistics, and it stresses the conjunction structure and
the feedback mechanism of the system. The realization of the SD
model is easier, and its application extent is more extensive than
that of other models [24]. Finally, it should be noted that in the
current study, the SD simulation model is implemented through
the use of Vensim DSS software.2.2. Model description
A PMD-transformation system is one in which PMD is trans-
formed into actual medical demand; when such a transformation
occurs, the medical demands of patients whose demands cannot
be realized (for various socioeconomic reasons) can be more easily
met and, within the context of this study, the health conditions ofChina’s citizens can be improved. This system involves four sub-
jects—namely, health service institutions, health insurance institu-
tions, governments, and patients. Currently, health insurance
compensation is far from comprehensive; there are three main
types of health insurance in China, but only the basic medical
insurance for urban workers has a relatively high compensation
level. Most of those who hold the basic medical insurance for urban
residents and the new rural cooperative medical insurance must
pay a majority of medical expenses by themselves; only 62.5% of
China’s rural population with health insurance declared that part
of their medical expenses had ever been compensated. In fact,
the medical demands of these two subsets of the population have
remained unmet, mainly on account of economic factors. The two-
week morbidity rate of the whole of China’s population in 2008
(18.9%) increased by 32.2 percentage points, compared to 2003
(14.3%); the morbidity rate of people with chronic disease in
2008 (20.0%) increased by 32.5 percentage points, compared to
that of 2003 (15.1%). Additionally, 24.4% of China’s population
declared that because of their poor economic status and the high
cost of medical services, they did not seek medical care when they
needed it; 70.3% of patients who needed hospitalization had failed
to be hospitalized because of the economic difficulty that doing so
incurs [11]. All these data and evidence indicate that the health
status of China’s population is worsening, and that their volume
of medical demand is greatly increasing. Meanwhile, the income
structure of hospitals and community health systems (CHSs) is
unreasonable, and the financial compensation mechanism therein
is unsound. Among the total health expenditures of hospitals, the
proportion of input from the government is always lower than that
from residents and social groups: in 2012, for example, those fig-
ures were 30.0%, 34.4%, and 35.6%, respectively. Meanwhile, the
proportion of the input from the government continues to
decrease; among the total income of hospitals and CHSs, that
brought in on account of medical services is always higher than
that brought in from financial compensation from the government
[11]. This incomplete medical expenditure compensation mecha-
nism has pushed hospitals and CHSs to pursue economic benefits
by increasing the prices that they charge for medical services. As
mentioned, the deterioration of health status and the increasing
medical demand of patients in China, in combination with the
low-level health insurance system currently in place, the high
medical expenses, and the lack of input and compensation from
the government, have exacerbated PMD. Making improvements
to this system would promote interaction, communication, and
cooperation among health service institutions, patients, the health
insurance system, and the government; optimize health resource
allocation, the compensation system, and the medical service price
system; and help satisfy medical demand while transforming PMD
into real demand. Ultimately, China, its society, its hospitals, its
CHSs, and its patients would benefit from a successful PMD-
transformation system.
2.3. Causal loop diagram
Based on the conceptual model of a PMD-transformation
system, and combined with factors that influence the behavior of
the four major components, a causal loop diagram can be
developed. According to factors that affect medical demand in
developed countries—and which have been the topics of research
(e.g., level of current health expenditure, number of medical acts,
number of sick people, prices of available services, reimbursement
arrangements, medical density, new patient requirements, techni-
cal progress, and medical advances) [28]—specific factors influence
medical demand in China, including the proportion of individual
health payment, health service expenses, visits of patients to
primary health institutions, accessibility to health service, and
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logic model that represents the interactions and interrelations
among the key factors. The connotations of the causal loops in
the diagram are explicated as follows.
Analysis of the high proportion of individual health payment. At
present, both health insurance coverage and the reimbursements
made by health insurance are at low levels, and the proportion of
health payments made by individuals is still too high. Although
the Chinese government has made great efforts to enlarge the cov-
erage of its health insurance (i.e., the coverage rate reached 87.1%,
as of 2008), many studies and statistics have shown that the cur-
rent compensation system is inequitable and unreasonable
[37,95]: the average compensation level, for example, is only
25.3%. Additionally, the proportion of individual health expendi-
ture is still too high, comprising 34.4% of all health expenditures
in 2012 [14]. All these circumstances have greatly and dramatically
increased PMD in China.
Analysis of the increase in health service expenses. Health service
expenses are highly, mainly on account of three factors. First,
health service expenses are influenced by the development of
chronic diseases and social aging. According to the definition of
‘‘aging,” China entered a stage of societal aging at the beginning
of the 21st century; the proportion of people older than 65 years
reached 7.0% in 2000, and it had grew to 9.4% in 2012. Additionally,
the morbidity rate of chronic diseases reached 15.7% in 2008, and
increased by 22.7% in 1998 and by 27.6% in 2003 [11]. Second,
induced demand and excessive medical treatment have played
significant roles in the increase in health service expenses.
Physician-induced demand exists extensively in health care
systems worldwide—such as that for newborn treatment in Japan
[84]—and it creates excessive medical treatment; this has been
seen in some statistics and pieces of literature below. When one
examines the statistics in An Analysis Report of National Health
Services Survey in China [11], one can see that if the number of
doctors in China were to increase by 10%, the number
of outpatients would increase by 3.6% [96]. The incomplete state
of China’s health surveillance and management system makes it
possible for induced demand and excessive medical treatment to
continue unabated. Third, drug, material, and inspection expenses
in China are too high; at present, the main compensation channel
of hospitals and CHSs is health service expenses, a majority of
which comes from the marketing of drugs and conducting unnec-
essary inspections. The ratios of drug and material expenses to
total expenses have also increased too rapidly: in 2012, they
accounted for 51.3% of all outpatient medical expenses and 41.3%
of all hospitalization medical expenses. In addition, the current
price policy is ineffective and ossified, and compensation from
the government accounts for a relative small proportion (8.15%)
[14]; this has led to high drug and material expenses and high
inspection expenses with regards to expensive equipment, and
thereby increased the financial burden placed on China’s citizens.
Analysis of the decrease in visits of patients to primary health insti-
tutions, and of accessibility to health services. Presently, a majority of
patients would like to seek medical care in hospitals rather than
visit a primary health institution. The proportion of visits of
patients to primary health institutions accounted for 61.87%,
60.68%, and 59.65% in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively; this is
in keeping with a decreasing trend compared to previous years,
and it indicates that the health care system is just as out of balance
as ever [14]. As a result, too many people are crowded into hospi-
tals, and this creates health care service bottlenecks there. This
phenomenon occurs mainly on account of the unreasonable health
resource structure, which assumes a reverse-triangle structure (i.e.,
much more health resources are allocated to hospitals, while pri-
mary health institutions are greatly lacking health resources). At
the same time, this irrational structure has led to too muchattention being paid to disease treatment, rather than to disease
prevention. Meanwhile, the reasons behind the unreasonable
resource structure and the unavailability of health services are that
the main compensation channel continues to be health service
expenses, and the rate of return of the medical market is too high.
Analysis of the poor health payment capability of some residents.
There are still many poor people in China. National statistics
indicate that poverty continues to be a serious problem, with the
extremely low-income population accounting for 9.1% of the whole
population (as well as 10.1% of the urban population and 8.7% of
the rural population). Alarmingly, 24.4% of the population who
should be receiving medical treatment decline to do so, on account
of the high cost of medical services and their poor economic situ-
ation [11]. Therefore, owing to their adverse economic situation,
individuals within the low-income population cannot afford to
take on medical expenditures, and this ultimately restricts the nec-
essary medical demand.
In consideration of the interactions inherent in China’s health
delivery system and the findings within the literature, the biggest
obstacles to satisfying medical demand are the patients’ economic
conditions, the health service institutions themselves, China’s
health insurance system, and the involvement of the Chinese gov-
ernment. It is of great importance and significance that PMD be
transformed into real demand, and the health conditions of the
whole of China be improved; this can ultimately be brought about
by implementing compensation system reforms and making
changes to health financing, enhancing the internal power of hos-
pitals, strengthening the responsibilities of the Chinese govern-
ment, and alleviating the financial burden placed on patients.
Given that more and more health system performance problems
are being generated in China, the various levels of government
need to seek out and enact solutions more rapidly, and create a
balancing-feedback loop where more solutions lead to fewer prob-
lems. However, even when problems are solved temporarily, there
can exist many unexpected consequences in the long term, the
worst of which is the increased need to transform PMD. Such unex-
pected consequences could not only offset currently effective solu-
tions, but also exacerbate current problems and make them more
complex and difficult.
2.4. Stock–flow diagram
To make accurate and reasonable analyses and evaluations, it is
necessary to quantify the various variables within a model. In this
model, the indicator is ‘‘the actual percentage of patients not seek-
ing medical care”; this refers to patients who need medical care
but who, for various reasons, fail to receive it. This phenomenon
is a suitable starting point in reflecting on the state of PMD. In
terms of medical care provision, the health delivery system com-
prises hospitals and CHSs; apart from the service providers, how-
ever, the issue of PMD transformation is simultaneously affected
by patient behavior and by health policies established by the gov-
ernment (i.e., health insurance). Patient behavior can affect medi-
cal demand, and this behavior can in turn be affected by their
own health conditions, financial situations, and self-treatment,
inter alia—which can, in turn, affect the amount of medical services
provided by virtue of supply–demand balance theory. Additionally,
the behavior of health service institutions can affect patients’ will-
ingness to seek out medical care, on account of the medical
expenses incurred, the technologies used, the convenience of
transportation, and so on. Both the behavior of patients and of
health service institutions, furthermore, can be restricted by the
health insurance system and by policies issued by the government
(e.g., the price system, the compensation system, etc.). We can see
that the four major components are interrelated and interact with
each other, and hence codetermine PMD transformation. In
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Fig. 1. Casual loop diagram of a PMD-transformation system in China.
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subsystems (i.e., those of medical demand, outpatients in hospitals,
inpatients in hospitals, outpatients in CHSs, and inpatients in
CHSs). The five subsystems interact with each other through input
and output variables contained within these subsystems and
which are closely related. In this study, we focus on outpatient
medical demand, and so the three major subsystems are those of
medical demand, outpatients in hospitals, and outpatients in CHSs.
These three subsystems interrelate with each other through the
visiting rate and the number of visits. The visiting rate and the
number of visits to hospitals and CHSs constitute the total number
of visits, which jointly decides the observation variable ‘‘the actual
percentage of patients not seeking medical care” and the variable
‘‘morbidity rate per year” in the subsystem of medical demand.
In addition, given that referrals between hospitals and CHSs would
overly complicate our analysis, this study interrelates the two
subsystems through only one link. The subsystem of inpatients in
hospitals and the subsystem of inpatients in CHSs interrelate with
the whole system by linking with the subsystem of outpatients in
hospitals and CHSs, respectively; the link between them is the
variable ‘‘income of hospitalization.” Understanding these relation-
ships and interactions can help us develop a SDmodel by which we
can analyze a PMD-transformation system in China.
Fig. 2 represents the stock–flow diagram of the system, based
on the causal loop diagram. This diagram summarizes the model
by establishing some hypotheses, thus simplifying our analysis
and evaluation and helping readers better understand the
PMD-transformation system. The stock variables are state
variables, which are depicted in the figure as rectangles. The inputs
and outputs between stocks are connected with flow variables,
which represent the rate variables and are depicted as double-
lined arrows. Inter-relationships among various variables are
linked with single-lined arrows.
Stock variables include total population, amount of hospital
resources, and amount of CHS resources. Flow variables include
number of births, number of deaths, increment of hospital
resources, depreciation of hospital resources, increment of CHS
resources, and depreciation of CHS resources. Auxiliary variablesinclude visiting rate to hospitals, visiting rate to CHSs, hospitaliza-
tion rate at hospitals, hospitalization rate at CHSs, average outpa-
tient price of hospitals, average outpatient price of CHSs, average
hospitalization price of hospitals, average hospitalization price of
CHSs, morbidity rate per year, number of patients per year, number
of hospitals, number of CHSs, average individual income, health
insurance expense per capita, input to hospitals from the govern-
ment, input to CHSs from the government, and average value of
general real estate. The initial variables include initial value of total
population, initial average outpatient price of hospitals, initial
average outpatient price of CHSs, initial average hospitalization
price of hospitals, initial average hospitalization price of CHSs, ini-
tial number of hospitals, initial individual income, initial health
insurance expense per capita, initial number of CHSs, initial input
to hospital from the government, initial input to CHSs from the
government, initial amount of hospital resources, and initial
amount of CHS resources. The constant variables include birth rate,
death rate, average ratio of input by hospitals per year, average
ratio of input by CHSs per year, fixed depreciation rate, proportion
of health expenditure in consumption expenditure, and growth
rate of income. The observation indicators mainly include the
actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care, number
of visits to hospitals, and number of visits to CHSs. All these vari-
ables were selected in line with the literature, as clarified below.
The variables in the subsystem of medical demand were ana-
lyzed (Fig. 3). The behavior of patients is mainly influenced by
age [44], multichannel communications with physicians [51], tech-
nical level, communication skills, respect shown by doctors to
patients [32], social supports, and having a health-promoting life-
style [85,94]. These patients’ behaviors can be embodied by the
health status of the population and the visiting rate, both of which
are influenced by various socioeconomic factors. Thus, to simplify
the SD model, we employed the variable ‘‘number of patients per
year” to reflect the health status of the population, and this vari-
able is determined through the use of the morbidity rate per year
and the total population [18]; the total population is further
decided by the number of births, the birth rate, the number of
deaths, and the death rate. In addition, the variable ‘‘the actual
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Fig. 2. The system dynamics model of a PMD-transformation system in China. Three level variables: amount of hospital resources, amount of CHS resources, total population.
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reflect PMD [61], and it is jointly determined by the number of
patients per year, the number of visits, and the number of
untreated visits. Here, we would like to state that, as discussed
above, there is no significant difference in the demand and use of
medical services between the urban and rural populations, and
so to simplify the whole model, we did not break out the
population thus; rather, we regarded it as a whole.
We analyzed the variables in the subsystems of outpatients in
hospitals and CHSs (Figs. 4 and 5). To simplify the entire system,as mentioned, referrals between hospitals and CHSs were not taken
into consideration; therefore, the subsystem of outpatients in hos-
pitals and CHSs were related to the subsystem of medical demand
by virtue of only two variables—namely, the number of patients
per year and the number of visits. The number of patients per year
will influence the number of visits to hospitals and CHSs, through
three main factors—namely, accessibility to hospitals and CHSs,
technology level of hospitals and CHSs, and outpatient financing
of hospitals and CHSs. In turn, the number of visits to hospitals
and CHSs will ultimately determine the number of visits and
visiting rate of
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care. All three factors affect the number of visits to hospitals and
CHSs by influencing the visiting rate to hospitals and CHSs; thishas already been demonstrated [14]. The drivers of seeking out
medical care among the people of China mainly include close loca-
tion (56.0%), good-quality services (16.0%), trust in doctors (9.0%),
406 W. Yu et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 57 (2015) 399–414reasonable medical expenses (4.9%), specific health institutions
(3.7%), facilities being well equipped with devices and materials
(3.6%), patients having relatives in health institutions (3.0%),
facility personnel providing service in a good manner (1.2%), a suf-
ficient amount of drugs (0.7%), and other reasons (1.8%) [14].
Through the use of brainstorming, we chose three such influencing
factors: accessibility to hospitals and CHSs (in accordance with
close location), technology level of hospitals and CHSs (in accor-
dance with good-quality services, trust in doctors, specific health
institutions, being well equipped with devices and materials, hav-
ing relatives in health institutions, and sufficient drugs), and the
factor of outpatient financing of hospitals and CHSs (in accordance
with reasonable medical expenses). Accessibility to hospitals and
CHSs can be estimated by using the accessibility chart, which is
generated by considering the density of resources—something
determined through field research and expert consultation
[83,67]. The technology level of hospitals and CHSs can be esti-
mated by using the technology-level chart, which is generated by
considering the average real estate, average value of general real
estate, number of hospitals and CHSs, the amount of resources,
and the total income of hospitals and CHSs; the total income
consists of input from the government [46] and outpatient and
inpatient market income [16]. The factor of outpatient financing
of hospitals and CHSs can be estimated by using the chart of
outpatient financing and the factor of outpatient payment
capability—of which, the latter is jointly determined by consider-
ing individual payment of medical expense, health insurance
expense per capita [13], and average outpatient price [29]. The
average outpatient price is related to average individual income
(mainly influenced by the growth rate of income) [3] and the
proportion of health expenditure in consumption expenditure.
We also analyzed the variables in the subsystems of inpatients
in hospitals and CHSs (Fig. 6). Because the focus of this study is the
subsystem of outpatients and its goal is to simplify the model, the
two inpatient subsystems play a role only within their own circle
of economic influence. The inpatient subsystem relates to the out-
patient subsystem mainly through the variable ‘‘hospitalization
market income,” which directly influences the total income and
indirectly impacts the amount of resources, the technology level
of hospitals and CHSs, the visiting rate of outpatients, and number
of visits to hospitals and CHSs; this ultimately changes the actual
percentage of patients who do not seek medical care. In addition,
the hospitalization market income is decided by the number of
hospitalizations and the average hospitalization price. The number
of hospitalizations is in turn determined by considering the total
population and the hospitalization rate. The hospitalization rate
itself is similar to the visiting rate and is influenced by accessibility
to hospitals and CHSs, the technology level of hospitals and CHSs,
and the factor of inpatient financing of hospitals and CHSs. The
average hospitalization price, together with the individual pay-
ment of medical expenses and the health insurance expense per
capita, further influences the hospitalization rate by affecting the
factor of hospitalization payment capability.
The following are some explanations for the aforementioned
variables, as well as equations that reflect the relationships among
these variables.
First, the initial values of the variables and constant variables in
the model were determined using data in the Chinese Health Statis-
tical Yearbook 2012 [14] and An Analysis Report of National Health
Services Survey in China for 2008 [11]. The initial value for the total
population, as per these sources, was 1,328,020,000; the initial
average outpatient price for hospitals and CHSs was 138.3 RMB
and 84 RMB, respectively. The initial average hospitalization price
for hospitals and CHSs was 5234.1 RMB, and 2514.2 RMB, respec-
tively. The initial number of hospitals was 21,979, and the initial
number of CHSs was 32,860. The initial input to hospital fromthe government was 10,127,700 RMB, and its initial input to CHSs
was 1,921,950 RMB. The initial amount of hospital resources was
7590 ⁄ 21,979 CNY, and that of CHSs was 336 ⁄ 32,860 CNY. The
initial individual income was 3437 RMB, and the initial health
insurance expense per capita was 103.95 RMB. Meanwhile, the
birth and death rates were 0.01214 and 0.00706, respectively.
The average ratio of input by hospitals and by CHSs per year was
0.06 and 0.04, respectively. The fixed depreciation rate was 0.03,
and the growth rate of income was 0.108. Finally, the proportion
of health expenditure in consumption expenditure was 0.108.
Second, on the basis of these initial variables, we can construct
some level variables. For example, in 2012, China’s initial value for
the total population was 1,328,020,000; taking that value and the
constant variables (i.e., birth and death rates of 0.01214
and 0.00706, respectively), the equation by which to determine
the total population is: initial total population + number of
births  number of deaths. Additionally, the initial number of
hospitals and CHSs were, respectively, 21,979 and 32,860, and
the amounts of hospital and CHS resources were 75.9 and 3.36 mil-
lion CNY, respectively; therefore, the initial amount of hospital and
CHS resources was 7590 ⁄ 21,979 CNY and 336 ⁄ 32,860 CNY,
respectively; the equations by which to calculate the amount of
hospital and CHS resources are: amount of hospital resources = ini-
tial amount of hospital resources + increment of hospital
resources  depreciation of hospital resources, and amount of
CHS resources = initial amount of CHS resources + increment of
CHS resources  depreciation of CHS resources.
Third, by combining these data with the initial variables, constant
variables, and various change rates, we can construct some equa-
tions that refer to auxiliary variables. These functions take the gen-
eral form of ‘‘value of initial/constant variable ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ change
rate of the variable)”; the change rate of the variable was the
average change rate over several years, and it was calculated by
examining data from the Chinese Health Statistical Yearbook
(2010–2013) and An Analysis Report of the National Health Services
Survey in China (1993–2008). Thus, these formulations were
determined as follows:
Morbidity rate per year = 0.1886 ⁄ 26 ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.005)
Average outpatient price of hospitals = initial average outpa-
tient price of hospitals ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.0959)
Average outpatient price of CHSs = initial average outpatient
price of CHSs ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.017535)
Average hospitalization price of hospitals = initial average hos-
pitalization price of hospitals ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.088046)
Average hospitalization price of CHSs = initial average hospital-
ization price of CHSs ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.01368)
Input to hospital from the government = initial input to hospital
from the government ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.08)
Input to CHSs from the government = initial input to CHSs from
the government ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.08)
Number of hospitals = initial number of hospitals ⁄ EXP
(Time ⁄ 0.0084)
Number of CHSs = initial number of CHSs ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ change
rate of CHSs)
Average individual income = initial individual income ⁄ EXP
(Time ⁄ growth rate of income)
Health insurance expense per capita = initial amount of insur-
ance per person ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.08)
Average value of general real estate = 3000 ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.08)
Fourth, to address some uncertain factors and the complexity of
some influential mechanisms, we introduced the brainstorming
method, the Delphi method (involving 15 experts), and a question-
naire survey (of 12,000 subjects, and more than 80,000 outpatient
records) to determine the influencing factors and the relationships
among them. Thus, the main influencing factors of the visiting rate
and the hospitalization rate are accessibility to medical services,
hospitalization
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Fig. 6. Subsystems of inpatients in hospitals and CHSs.
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while, the ratios of the weight of accessibility to medical service,
technology level, and factor of the outpatient economy of outpa-
tients in hospitals were 0.2, 0.6, and 0.2; those of inpatients in hos-
pitals were 0.1, 0.5, and 0.4; those of outpatients in CHSs were 0.6,
0.1, and 0.3; and those of inpatients in CHSs were 0.3, 0.3, and 0.4.
Then, according to the prototype of the Classic Douglas function,
the power function equations can be constructed thus:
Visiting rate to hospitals = (accessibility to hospitals + 109)0.2 ⁄
(technology level of hospitals + 109)0.6 ⁄ (factor of the outpatient
economy of hospitals + 109)0.2
Visiting rate to CHSs = (accessibility to CHSs + 109)0.6 ⁄ (tech-
nology level of CHSs + 109)0.1 ⁄ (factor of the outpatient economy
of CHSs + 109)0.3
Hospitalization rate of hospitals = (accessibility to hospital
+ 109)0.2 ⁄ (technology level of hospital + 109)0.6 ⁄ (factor of the
outpatient economy of hospitals + 109)0.2
Hospitalization rate of CHSs = (accessibility to CHSs + 109)0.6 ⁄
(technology level of CHSs + 109)0.3 ⁄ (factor of the outpatient
economy of CHSs + 109)0.1
Fifth, we worked to explain table functions. While developing
the model, we classified some nonlinear variables as various
influencing factors; according to the results of field surveys, they
can be expressed only as their changing tendency, rather than as
mathematical functions. Thus, in line with SD modeling theory,
we introduced table functions to determine such relations. The
establishment of table functions was based on the description of
the current tendency and expert consultation, and the determina-
tion of table functions was in line with a dozen or dozens of data-
sets. Variable values that cannot be determined by examining the
survey data can be estimated by considering certain endpoints,
intermediate points, and the slope. In this study, table functions
were mainly employed to explain the influences of accessibility
to medical services, technology level, and economic factors on
patients’ choices of visiting a health care facility and beinghospitalized. Data in these table functions were all derived from
the survey results. In the table function, the meaning of each part
of the function can be explained. In the first squared bracket
behind the equal sign, the numerical values in the first rounded
bracket represent the minimum values of x and y; the numerical
values in the second rounded bracket represent the maximum val-
ues of x and y. The other rounded brackets following the first
squared bracket contain every pairing of the numerical values of
x and y. The table functions were shown in Appendix A.2.5. Model validation
To validate the model, we set the initial value of variables to
those of 2008 and simulated the model for the next four years
(2009–2012). This would help us demonstrate whether the model
aligns with the historical evolution of China’s health delivery sys-
tem. The validation results are shown in Table 2. The actual data
were taken from historical records from the Chinese Health Statisti-
cal Yearbook [14], and the simulated data were the results of vali-
dation analysis. One can see that the deviation between the actual
and simulated data was not significant—namely, between 1.73%
and 9.16%, which is within a reasonable range. Thus, the model is
considered validated and reasonable.2.6. Sensitivity analysis
The aim of sensitivity analysis is to generate and compare out-
puts by changing the model parameters and construction, and thus
determine their influence and assess the validity and reliability of
the given model. To analyze parameter sensitivity, one should first
pinpoint the sensitive parameters and restrict them to a reasonable
range, to observe responses to variations in the model. Parameter
sensitivity can be calculated in accordance with DY(t)/Y(t)—which
represents the change in the output variable (i.e., in this study, the
Table 2
Validation analysis of the model.
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of visits to
hospital
Actual data
(billion)
1.922 2.040 2.259 2.542
Simulated data
(billion)
2.098 2.16 2.22 2.587
Deviation 9.16% 5.88% 1.73% 1.77%
Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis of constant parameters.
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DX(t)/X(t)—which represents the changing variable. Thus, the
formulation of sensitivity can be expressed as SðtÞ ¼ DYðtÞ=YðtÞDXðtÞ=XðtÞ





.
In the current study, we chose four sensitive parameters with
variation rates between 10% and 10%, to simulate changes in
the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care. The four
variables chosen for sensitivity analysis were birth rate, death rate,
proportion of health expenditure in consumption expenditure, and
growth rate of income. All four variables were designed to concur-
rently change by between 10% and 10% of their current values,
thus making the model operate 200 times in total; this procedure
was conducted by leveraging the sensitivity simulation function in
Vensim. The results of this sensitivity analysis are presented in
Fig. 7. In so-called sensitivity analysis, making changes to one vari-
able will cause some slight variations, but it will not lead to
changes in the overall tendency. In light of this, in looking at
Fig. 3, we can see that among 200 cases, 50% of them are in the yel-
low area, 75% are in the green area, 95% are in the blue area, and
100% are in the gray area. It can be seen that the total tendency
of the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care con-
tinued to decrease; only the numerical values showed some slight
and reasonable changes. In analyzing the reasons behind these
changes, we know that the birth and death rates will affect the
total population, which will further influence the number of
patients per year; in addition, the increase in health expenditure
as a proportion of consumption expenditure, along with the
growth rate of income, will increase the economic factor and hence
further increase the visiting rate of patients. All these will ulti-
mately cause fluctuations in the actual percentage of patients not
seeking medical care. This result indicates that with changes to
the constant variables, variations in the actual percentage of
patients not seeking medical care will fall within a reasonable
range. The output variable—which mainly represents the behavior
of the model—did not show any extreme change as a result of
slight changes to the constant variables. Therefore, the model is
stable and reliable, and is considered suitable for simulation
analysis.
2.7. Intervention scenarios
Upon undertaking sensitivity analysis and several simulations,
we pinpointed the three variables that played the most significant
role in influencing the actual percentage of patients not seeking
medical care. The three constant parameters—namely, the number
of hospitals and CHSs, the outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs,
and health insurance—were selected for use in the intervention tri-
als. In the experiments detailed below, we reduced the number of
hospitals and increased the number of CHSs to various extents,
reduced the outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs, and adjusted
the standard of health insurance to various levels. The current sit-
uation was defined as the baseline, and four groups of experiments
were conducted. The first group explored the effect of the number
of hospitals and CHSs on the actual percentage of patients not
seeking medical care (i.e., tests 1, 2, and 3). The second group
explored the effect of the outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs
on the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care(i.e., tests 4, 5, and 6). The third group explored the effect of health
insurance on the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care (i.e., tests 7, 8, and 9). Finally, the fourth group of experiments
explored the joint effect of the number of hospitals and CHSs and
of health insurance on the actual percentage of patients not seek-
ing medical care (i.e., tests 10, 11, and 12). The system simulation
was set to a 20-year period. We compared the various experiment
results to the baseline, to assess whether these changes would suc-
cessfully transform PMD. Changes to the parameters were made as
shown in Table 3.3. Results
The model in this study was used in experiments that simulated
policy interventions, all of which would have effects on medical
demand and supply by virtue of changes to some of the parame-
ters. In the intervention trials, by changing some key parameters,
we could see and analyze changes to the effects on the actual per-
centage of patients not seeking medical care. The experiment
results were compared to the current situation (Figs. 8–11), in
which no intervention can be seen as the baseline (line 1 in each
figure) through the use of any influencing factors. Therefore,
noticeable changes in these intervention trials can be attributed
strictly to the interventions in question. In addition, in line with
the natural development of hospitals and CHSs, the economic
growth of the whole of society, and the proliferation of supportive
policies established by the Chinese government, the accessibility to
medical care, technology level of medical providers, and economic
factors of hospitals and CHSs will be promoted. Thus, even in the
absence of any intervention, the baseline percentage of patients
not seeking medical care will show a decreasing tendency. Based
on this premise, this study mainly concentrated on how to achieve
a low actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care, as
quickly as possible, rather than achieve a much lower percentage.
The specific results of the four intervention trials are shown in
Figs. 8–11.3.1. Effect of number of hospitals and CHSs on the actual percentage of
patients not seeking medical care
In this experiment, only the number of hospitals and CHSs was
changed; the other variables remained fixed. Fig. 8 shows the effect
of the number of hospitals and CHSs on the actual percentage of
patients not seeking medical care. As one can see from Fig. 4,
although the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care continued to decrease in the 20-year simulation under the sta-
tus quo and under all three simulation situations, in terms of PMD
transformation, the results of the three tests were more favorable
Table 3
Changes to the parameters of different intervention scenarios.
Group Test Scenario Parameter
Change 1 Value 1 Change 2 Value 2 Change 3 Value 3
1 Baseline Change the number of hospitals and CHSs Number of
hospitals
21,979 Number of
CHSs
32,860 – –
1 Decrease by
25%
16,484 Increase by
25%
41,075 – –
2 Decrease by
50%
10,990 Increase by
50%
49,290 – –
3 Decrease by
75%
5495 Increase by
75%
57,505 – –
2 Baseline Change the outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs Prices of
hospitals
138.3 Prices of
CHSs
84 – –
4 Decrease by
25%
103.73 Decrease by
25%
63 – –
5 Decrease by
50%
69.15 Decrease by
50%
42 – –
6 Decrease by
75%
34.58 Decrease by
75%
21 – –
3 Baseline Change the health insurance expense per capita Expense per
capita
103.95 – – – –
7 Increased by
50%
155.93 – – – –
8 Increased by
100%
207.9 – – – –
9 Increased by
200%
311.85 – – – –
4 Baseline Change the number of hospitals and CHSs, and health insurance
expense per capita
Number of
hospitals
21,979 Number of
CHSs
32,860 Expense per
capita
103.95
10 Decrease by
25%
16,484 Decrease by
25%
41,075 Increased by
50%
155.93
11 Decrease by
50%
10,990 Decrease by
50%
49,290 Increased by
100%
207.9
12 Decrease by
75%
5495 Decrease by
75%
57,505 Increased by
200%
311.85
Fig. 8. The variation trend of the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care after the number of hospitals and CHSs was changed. The estimated actual
percentage of patients not seeking medical care when adjusting the amount of
hospitals and CHSs would change in 20 years.
Fig. 9. The variation trend of the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care after the outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs were changed. The estimated
actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care when adjusting the
outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs would change in 20 years.
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pitals and an increase in the number of CHSs, the rate at which the
actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care fell was
much higher than that seen in the current situation. In addition,
the ultimate percentage of patients not seeking medical care in
each of the three scenarios was lower than that in the current sit-
uation; this indicated that changes to the number of hospitals and
CHSs indeed worked to lower PMD. In comparing the results of the
three experiments, although the decreasing rate seen in test 3 was
obviously higher than that in test 2 or 1 in the short term, the total
decreasing range of the three tests were all similar. These results
suggested that cutting the number of hospitals and increasingthe number of CHSs would have a significant and beneficial influ-
ence on the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care,
and thus lead to a larger, more effective, and faster decline in PMD
in both the short and long term.
3.2. Effect of outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs on the actual
percentage of patients not seeking medical care
Assuming that the outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs are
138.3 RMB and 84 RMB, respectively, we can derive the effect of
the outpatient prices of hospitals and CHSs on the actual percent-
age of patients not seeking medical care (Fig. 9); the other variables
Fig. 10. The variation trend of the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care after health insurance was changed. The estimated actual percentage of
patients not seeking medical care when adjusting health insurance would change in
20 years.
Fig. 11. The variation trend of the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care after number of hospitals and CHSs and health insurance was changed. The
estimated actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care when adjusting
number of hospitals and CHSs and health insurance would change in 20 years.
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patients not seeking medical care all showed a slight declining
trend in the first five years, but it lost its influence in the long term.
However, during the 5–20 years of the simulation, the percentage
across the three experiments was even higher than that in the cur-
rent situation. These results suggested that changes to the outpa-
tient prices of hospitals and CHSs would not play any role in
reducing the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care, and it would not increase the transformation of PMD, either.
3.3. Effect of health insurance on the actual percentage of patients not
seeking medical care
The effect of health insurance on the actual percentage of
patients not seeking medical care is shown in Fig. 10; the other
variables remained fixed. As one can see from the figure, compared
to the current situation (line 1), the higher the level of health insur-
ance is, the lower the percentage of patients not seeking medical
care would be. However, the changes were slight and smooth, thus
indicating that the effect of health insurance was not apparent.
3.4. Effect of number of hospitals and CHSs and health insurance on
the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care
Considering the aforementioned experiment results, regulating
the number of hospitals and CHSs and adjusting the level of healthinsurance would indeed have effects on the actual percentage of
patients not seeking medical care. Therefore, this experiment com-
bined these two influencing factors to explore changes to the
actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care; the results
are shown in Fig. 11, where one can see that the basic tendency is
similar to that in the experiments featuring changes to the number
of hospitals and CHSs. All the scenarios, including the current situ-
ation, showed a decreasing trend, but the rate at which the
decrease was happening was much higher in the simulations than
in the current situation, and the ultimate percentage in the simu-
lations was lower than that in the current situation. The lower
the number of hospitals is, the greater the number of CHSs would
be, and the higher the level of health insurance is, the lower the
percentage of patients not seeking medical demand in the long
termwould be, and the more quickly it would decrease in the short
term. In addition, owing to the influence of health insurance, the
changing range of the integrated plan was greater than that seen
in the single-adjustment experiments.4. Discussion and conclusions
Given the actual situation in China, the current health delivery
system is out of balance and there are some limitations in reducing
the PMD. At the moment, policies place more emphasis on hospi-
tals and overlook the establishment and development of CHSs.
Health insurance levels are still low, and individual-level health
expenditures are too high; together, these circumstances give rise
to a high proportion of PMD. In addition, as shown in the results of
the aforementioned experiments, the current actual percentage of
patients not seeking medical care is still too high. Adjusting the
current health delivery system would play a positive role in reduc-
ing the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical care; this
indicates that it is urgent to advance the transformation of PMD.
As can be seen from the simulation results, the influence of
changing both the number of hospitals and CHSs and the level of
health insurance was greatest in reducing the actual percentage
of patients not seeking medical care. On the other hand, the single
adjustment of the number of hospitals and CHSs played a relative
large role; the single adjustment of health insurance coverage
caused a slight and smooth change; and changes in the outpatient
prices of hospitals and CHSs played no role in reducing the actual
percentage of patients not seeking medical care. Consequently,
the experiment results suggested that adjusting the structure of
the number of hospitals and CHSs and improving the health insur-
ance level could together play a role in advancing PMD transforma-
tion. These results indicated that China’s current health delivery
system requires reasonable adjustments to health resource alloca-
tions between hospitals and CHS, that more attention needs to be
paid to CHSs, and a CHS-centered health delivery system needs to
be established—all of which, taken together, would effectively
reduce the medical costs of patients, increase the availability of
medical services, reduce the actual percentage of patients who
require medical care but do not seek it out, and alleviate the con-
tinuous growth of PMD. Ultimately, these changes would benefit
the whole of the population of China.
The high level of PMD can be partially explained by the relative
weakness of CHSs, unbalanced health resource allocations, and a
low-level economic compensation system. If such trends continue,
hospitals could become stronger and even more prevalent, thus
driving medical expenses higher and exacerbating PMD. To address
this problem, several measures can be taken, such as changing
unjustified resource allocations [7], including changes to health
care-oriented human resource allocations [6] and health budget
allocations between hospitals and CHSs; providing more support
to CHSs, including the provision of sufficient medical materials
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investing enough funds in the development and implementation
of CHSs, and increasing the transparency vis-à-vis the fund alloca-
tion process [66]; and improving health insurance policies, includ-
ing enlarging the coverage of health insurance, especially among
the underprivileged population [47], raising the level of health
insurance, providing a safe net for people (especially for those liv-
ing in rural areas), and reducing the out-of-pocket health expendi-
tures of households [86]. Since undertaking medical and health
system reforms in 2009, China has made many achievements; for
example, it has improved the coverage and compensation stan-
dards of health insurance, more than 33,000 basic medical and
health institutions have been enhanced, and the service capability
of CHSs has been improved. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to
accelerate the transformation of PMD. All the aforementioned sug-
gestions look to change the resource structure between hospitals
and CHSs, enhance the health service capacity of CHSs, and
improve the insurance of China’s entire population, by transform-
ing more PMD and ensuring that the basic health needs of citizens
are met.
Use of the SD model enabled us to estimate the amount of PMD
in the future, as well as trends thereof; its use allowed us to eval-
uate the influence of current policies on the basis of limited histor-
ical data. Generally speaking, the SD model is a methodological
technique by which one can explore complicated scientific prob-
lems, and its use makes it possible to generate a more scientific
and persuasive method of analyzing management problems in
complex socioeconomic systems. Compared to some mathematical
simulation models such as Monte Carlo—although both Monte
Carlo and the SD model are appropriate for use with complicated
systems—the SD model can simulate changing trends over a con-
tinuous period. What’s more, the SD model overcomes several dif-
ficulties: it can use limited historical data to construct models,
anticipate future development and trends with respect to some
complex issues, and simulate the effectiveness of policies.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to use an SD
model to qualitatively analyze China’s PMD-transformation sys-
tem. This model was used to analyze various factors that influence
PMD transformation in China; doing so allowed us to explore rela-
tionships between hospitals and CHSs, and it made it possible to
calculate and estimate—solely on the basis of several limited his-
torical data—the actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care in a changing environment. Furthermore, the model of ‘‘PMD
transformation” can be used to guide policy-making, and such
guiding information can be garnered simply by changing some
variables and simulating various scenarios. By using this model,
one can answer questions about China’s high level of PMD, and
thereby deal with the inherent unfairness of the country’s health
delivery system in the long term. In essence, the use of this model
can help China’s policy-makers formulate a more efficient health
care reform project.
In the first attempt to construct a SD model and address the
issue of ‘‘PMD transformation” while undertaking some
intervention-oriented experiments, it became apparent that some
limitations necessitate further research in the future. At the
moment, this model can deal with various factors and variables,
such as visiting rate to hospitals and CHSs, the hospitalization rate
of hospitals and CHSs, population growth, changes to investment
from the government, the health characteristics of the population,
health insurance expenses, and changes in medical services
demand. However, we must concede that an important limitation
of SD models is their inability to provide estimates of uncertainty;
to overcome this limitation and extend the current research, we
would like in future studies to combine it with other methods. In
addition, several assumptions and relationships inherent in the
model have been simplified; for example, we looked at the popula-tion as a whole, and did not construct and simulate a model based
on different populations in urban and rural areas. Some influencing
factors in the model have been condensed. And the current model
does not take into account certain factors and elements, such as the
health supervision system, individual characteristics, and prefer-
ence, nor does it consider in intervention trials the specific ratio
of health resources between hospitals and CHSs. All these deficien-
cies and problems can be addressed, and the established model can
be further enhanced by making it more reasonable and practical.
In conclusion, the problems inherent in China’s
‘‘PMD-transformation system” are mainly caused by the country’s
defective health delivery system. Based on China’s current system-
atic structure, health resource allocation structure, compensation
and financing system, and health insurance system, the Chinese
government should make great efforts to promote the internal
power and structure of health delivery system mainly while
concentrating on the reallocation of health resources between
hospitals and CHSs and improving health insurance coverage;
doing so would provide health institutions with a worthwhile
and appropriate direction for development.Conflict of interest
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(2012QN09).Appendix A. Mathematical equations used by the model
Total population = INTEG (+number of births  number of
deaths, 1,328,020,000)
Number of births = total population ⁄ birth rate
Number of deaths = total population ⁄ death rate
Birth rate = 0.01214
Death rate = 0.00706
Morbidity rate per year = 0.1886 ⁄ 26 ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.005)
Number of patients per year = morbidity rate per year ⁄ total
population
The actual percentage of patients not seeking medical
care = number of untreated patients/number of visits per year
Number of untreated patients = number of patients per year-
number of visits
Number of visits = number of visits to hospitals + number of vis-
its to CHSs
Number of visits to hospitals = number of patients per
year ⁄ visiting rate of hospitals
Outpatient market income of hospitals = number of visits to
hospitals ⁄ average outpatient price of hospitals
Total income of hospitals = input to hospitals by government
+ outpatient market income of hospitals + hospitalization market
income of hospitals
Input to hospitals from the government = initial input to hospi-
tals from the government ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.08)
Initial input to hospitals from the government = 10,127,700
Hospitalization market income of hospitals = number of hospi-
talizations to hospitals ⁄ average hospitalization price of hospitals
Amount of hospital resources = INTEG (+increment of hospital
resources  depreciation of hospital resources, 7590 ⁄ 21,979)
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average ratio of input from hospitals per year
Depreciation of hospital resources = fixed depreciation rate ⁄
amount of hospital resources
Average ratio of input by hospitals per year = 0.06
Fixed depreciation rate = 0.03
Average real estate of hospitals = amount of hospital resources/
number of hospitals
Ratio of average real estate of hospitals and average value of
general real estate = average real estate of hospitals/average value
of general real estate
Average value of general real estate = 3000 ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.08)
Chart of technology level of hospitals = [(0,0)–(10,000,1)],
(0,0.156), (117.25,0.168), (232.75,0.234), (712.8,0.2937),
(1167.25,0.336), (2051,0.4755), (2740.5,0.4898), (3150,0.528),
(4320,0.651), (5763,0.727), (6428,0.7835), (7379,0.8402),
(8462,0.933), (10,000,1)
Technology level of hospitals = chart of technology level of hos-
pitals (‘‘average real estate of hospitals/average value of general
real estate”)
Chart of accessibility to hospitals = [(0,0)–(0.3,1)], (0,0.05824),
(0.0972477,0.06842), (0.2,0.18), (0.252294,0.52632),
(0.273394,0.75264), (0.3,1)
Accessibility to hospitals = chart of accessibility to hospitals
(density of hospital resources)
Number of hospitals = initial number of hospitals ⁄ EXP
(Time ⁄ 0.0084)
Initial number of hospitals = 21,979
Density of hospital resources = number of hospitals/total
population
Average outpatient price of hospitals = initial average outpa-
tient price of hospitals ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.0959)
Initial average outpatient price of hospitals = 138.3
Factor of outpatient payment capability of hospitals = (individ-
ual payment of medical expense + health insurance expense per
capita)/average outpatient price of hospitals
Factor of outpatient financing of hospitals = chart of outpatient
financing of hospitals (factor of outpatient payment capability of
hospitals)
Proportion of health expenditure in consumption
expenditure = 0.108
Average individual income = initial individual income ⁄ EXP
(growth rate of income ⁄ Time)
Growth rate of income = 0.108
Initial individual income = 3437
Individual payment of medical expense = average individual
income ⁄ proportion of health expenditure in consumption
expenditure
Initial health insurance expense per capita = 103.95
Health insurance expense per capita = initial amount of insur-
ance per person ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.08)
Chart of outpatient financing of hospitals = [(0,0)–(60,1)],
(0.0244648,0.05386), (1.10092,0.0964912), (2.81346,0.7021),
(3.60856,0.73635), (5.01529,0.74872), (6.75841,0.79559),
(8.40979,0.82807), (9.90826,0.83682), (15,0.83946),
(30,0.99568), (45,1)
Visiting rate of hospitals = (accessibility to hospitals + 109)0.2 ⁄
(technology level of hospitals + 109)0.6 ⁄ (factor of outpatient
financing of hospitals + 109)0.2
Number of visits to CHSs = number of patients per year ⁄ visit-
ing rate of CHSs
Outpatient market income of CHSs = average outpatient price of
CHSs ⁄ number of visits to CHSs
Total income of CHSs = input to CHS from the government
+ hospitalization market income of CHSs + outpatient market
income of CHSsInput to CHSs from the government = initial input to CHSs from
the government ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.08)
Initial input to CHSs from the government = 1,921,950
Amount of CHSs resources = INTEG (+increment of CHSs
resources  depreciation of CHSs resources, 336 ⁄ 32,860)
Increment of CHSs resources = total income of CHSs ⁄ average
ratio of input from CHSs per year
Depreciation of CHSs resources = fixed depreciation rate ⁄
amount of CHSs resources
Average ratio of input from CHSs per year = 0.04
Average real estate of CHSs = amount of CHSs resources/number
of CHSs
Ratio of average real estate of CHSs and average value of general
real estate = average real estate of CHSs/average value of general
real estate
Chart of technology level of CHSs = [(0,0)–(1000,1)], (0,0.3377),
(100.3,0.3575), (122.3,0.3837), (238.6,0.4605), (345.6,0.579),
(474,0.628), (620.8,0.73627), (752.2,0.7982), (896,0.8197),
(972.4,0.9708), (1000,1)
Technology level of CHSs = chart of technology level of CHSs =
(‘‘average real estate of CHSs/average value of general real estate”)
Number of CHSs = initial number of CHSs ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ change
rate of CHSs)
Initial number of CHSs = 32,860
Chart of accessibility to CHSs = [(0,0)–(10,1)], (0,0.2724),
(2.47706,0.3181), (3.48624,0.4106), (4.95413,0.5198),
(6.20795,0.7829), (7.52294,0.8781), (8.92966,0.9316), (10,1)
Density of CHSs resources = number of CHSs/total population
Accessibility to CHSs = chart of accessibility to CHSs (density of
CHSs resources)
Average outpatient price of CHSs = initial average outpatient
price of CHSs ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.017535)
Initial average outpatient price of CHSs = 84
Factor of outpatient payment capability of CHSs = (individual
payment of medical expense + health insurance expense per cap-
ita)/average outpatient price of CHSs
Chart of outpatient financing of CHSs = [(0,0)–(400,1)],
(0.0611621,0.09886), (2.07951,0.1453), (3.42508,0.175),
(5.3211,0.2548), (6.78899,0.4052), (7.76758,0.4943),
(8.74618,0.6017), (9.48012,0.6724), (11.2538,0.6785),
(15.107,0.6847), (18.3486,0.723684), (18.6544,0.7239),
(19.8777,0.7345), (23.5474,0.79386), (28.7462,0.820175),
(33.945,0.837719), (39.1437,0.929825), (46.789,0.942982),
(54.7401,0.973684), (62.0795,0.97807), (70,1), (355,1)
Factor of outpatient financing of CHSs = chart of outpatient
financing of CHSs (factor of outpatient payment capability of CHSs)
Visiting rate of CHSs = (accessibility to CHSs + 109)0.6 ⁄ (tech-
nology level of CHSs + 109)0.1 ⁄ (factor of outpatient financing of
CHSs + 109)0.3
Hospitalization visits of hospitals = total population ⁄ hospital-
ization rate of hospitals
Hospitalization rate of hospitals = (accessibility to hospitals
+ 109)0.1 ⁄ (technology level of hospitals + 109)0.5 ⁄ (factor of
hospitalization financing of hospitals + 109)0.4
Factor of inpatient financing of hospitals = chart of inpatient
financing of hospitals (factor of inpatient payment capability of
hospitals)
Chart of inpatient financing of hospitals = [(0,0)–(4,1)], (0,0),
(0.718654,0.2527), (0.990826,0.42), (1.40673,0.5747),
(1.90826,0.6316), (2.25076,0.741228), (3.24159,0.864035), (4,1),
(4.05199,0.964912)
Factor of inpatient payment capability of hospitals = (individual
payment of medical expense + health insurance expense per cap-
ita)/average hospitalization price of hospitals
Average hospitalization price of hospitals = initial average hos-
pitalization price of hospitals ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.088046)
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Hospitalization visits of CHSs = total population ⁄ hospitaliza-
tion rate of CHSs
Hospitalization market income of CHSs = hospitalization visits
of CHSs ⁄ average hospitalization price of CHSs
Average hospitalization price of CHSs = initial average hospital-
ization price of CHSs ⁄ EXP (Time ⁄ 0.01368)
Initial average hospitalization price of CHSs = 2514.2
Factor of hospitalization payment capability of CHSs = (individ-
ual payment of medical expense + health insurance expense per
capita)/average hospitalization price of CHSs
Chart of inpatient financing of CHSs = [(0.02,0)–(10,1)],
(0.0122324,0.007895), (0.880734,0.1816), (1.63914,0.2684),
(2.54434,0.3947), (2.54434,0.3947), (3.22807,0.4728),
(3.22807,0.4728), (3.98777,0.7071), (4.94404,0.8369),
(6.8745,0.864035), (10,1)
Factor of inpatient financing of CHSs = chart of inpatient financ-
ing of CHSs (factor of inpatient payment capability of CHSs)
Hospitalization rate of CHSs = (accessibility to CHSs + 109)0.3 ⁄
(technology level of CHSs + 109)0.3 ⁄ (factor of inpatient financing
of CHSs + 109)0.4
Ratio of number of patients between CHSs and hospitals =
number of visits to CHSs/number of visits to hospitals.References
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